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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 17-1914 
____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
BOLA PETERS, 
     a/k/a Bola M. Kassim; 
a/k/a Muti Kassim; 
a/k/a Rene Copley; 
     a/k/a Elizabeth Brown; 
 
Bola Peters, 
 Appellant 
 
____________________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
For the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Crim. Action No. 1-14-cr-00012-012) 
District Judge: Honorable David S. Cercone 
____________________________________________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
January 23, 2018 
 
Before:  GREENAWAY, JR., KRAUSE, Circuit Judges, 
and JONES, District Judge.* 
 
(Opinion filed: February 15, 2018) 
 
 
 
                                           
* The Honorable John E. Jones, III, United States District Judge for the Middle 
District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. 
2 
 
 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
JONES, District Judge. 
 Bola Peters appeals her judgment of conviction for conspiracy to commit wire 
fraud. Ms. Peters argues that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to prove her 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm. 
I. Background 
 This case involves a years-long scheme of stealing identities, filing false tax 
returns with the stolen identities, and fraudulently collecting tax refunds. The IRS 
identified more than 1000 false tax returns between 2010 and 2012 alone. The fraudulent 
refunds were routed to more than 3600 bank accounts set up at 443 financial institutions 
across the United States. Because of the sheer number of false returns and bank accounts, 
the FBI subpoenaed bank records from a random sample of 100 bank accounts. Agents 
also sought ATM surveillance photos because the cash had been withdrawn from most of 
the accounts through ATM transactions. Although the FBI identified several major 
players in their investigation, many of the co-conspirators’ roles consisted of opening 
bank accounts with stolen identities, withdrawing the refunds from ATMs, keeping a 
percentage, and transferring the remaining money to those of higher rank in the 
conspiracy. This was the role Ms. Peters played. 
                                           
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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 Ms. Peters’s name appeared on one of the bank accounts in the 100-account 
sample, and authorities had identified fraudulent refunds among the deposits. The FBI 
obtained a search warrant for Ms. Peters’s home, where they found a total of thirteen 
Social Security cards and New York State driver’s licenses in different names in addition 
to one blank Social Security card. The FBI also located a notebook and other pages that 
had handwritten entries listing stolen identify information. Finally, authorities found a 
distinctive, multi-colored shirt that also was seen in ATM surveillance photos. None of 
the fraudulent identification documents found in Ms. Peters’s home implicated her 
husband. Agents later interviewed Ms. Peters, who admitted that she used false identities 
to open bank accounts in 2008. She further said she was instructed to open the accounts 
by someone named Lowah, and that she would make cash withdrawals from an ATM, 
keep ten percent, and transfer the remainder of the withdrawal to Lowah. Ms. Peters also 
knew that others were involved in the scheme, although she did not know their roles or 
names.  
 In May 2015, a grand jury in the Western District of Pennsylvania returned a fifth 
superseding indictment accusing Ms. Peters and nearly two dozen others of conspiracy to 
commit wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349. The matter went to trial in October 
2016. At the close of the Government’s case, Ms. Peters moved for judgment of acquittal 
under Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, arguing insufficiency of the 
evidence, which the District Court denied. Ms. Peters called one witness and rested. On 
October 21, 2016, the jury found Ms. Peters guilty. She was sentenced to sixty months in 
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prison and a three-year term of supervised release. Ms. Peters now appeals her judgment 
of conviction. 
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 The District Court properly exercised jurisdiction of the underlying matter 
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction to review appeals from all final 
decisions of the District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 “[W]e review a sufficiency of the evidence challenge de novo, viewing the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution.” United States v. Bryant, 655 
F.3d 232, 240 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing United States v. Miller, 527 F.3d 54, 60 (3d Cir. 
2008)). Appellants bear a heavy burden. We “will overturn a verdict only ‘if no 
reasonable juror could accept evidence as sufficient to support the conclusion of the 
defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Anderskow, 
88 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir. 1996)). “Under this particularly deferential standard, we ‘must 
be ever vigilant . . . not to usurp the role of the jury by weighing credibility and assigning 
weight to the evidence, or by substituting [our] judgment for that of the jury.’” United 
States v. Caraballo-Rodriguez, 726 F.3d 418, 430 (3d Cir. 2013) (alteration in the 
original) (quoting United States v. Brodie, 403 F.3d 123, 133 (3d Cir. 2005)). 
“Furthermore, ‘we review the evidence as a whole, not in isolation, and ask whether it is 
strong enough for a rational trier of fact to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Id. 
(quoting U.S. v. Boria, 592 F.3d 476, 480 (3d Cir. 2010)). 
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III. Discussion 
 Ms. Peters was convicted of conspiracy to commit wire fraud pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. § 1349. To prove its case, the Government needed to prove that Peters agreed with 
one or more persons to commit wire fraud, which consists of three elements: “(1) the 
defendant’s knowing and willful participation in a scheme or artifice to defraud, (2) with 
the specific intent to defraud, and (3) the use of . . . interstate wire communications in 
furtherance of the scheme.” United States v. Andrews, 681 F.3d 509, 518 (3d Cir. 2012) 
(quoting United States v. Antico, 275 F.3d 245, 261 (3d Cir. 2001)). Ms. Peters argues 
that the Government failed to prove the first element. We disagree. 
 Ms. Peters admitted that she had been instructed to open bank accounts with stolen 
identities, had withdrawn the fraudulent tax refunds, and had skimmed her allotted ten 
percent and wired the remainder to “Lowah.” She also admitted that she knew there were 
other co-conspirators, even if she did not know their names. These admissions alone were 
sufficient to prove the first element of wire fraud. Ms. Peters’s suggestion that the 
Government needed to produce witnesses who could provide direct evidence of her 
knowledge of the scheme is unpersuasive. Ms. Peters amply demonstrated her knowledge 
in her voluntary statement to the authorities. Moreover, “finding of guilt in a conspiracy 
case does not depend on the government introducing direct evidence that a defendant was 
a knowing participant in the conspiracy; circumstantial evidence can carry the day.” 
United States v. Claxton, 685 F.3d 300, 305 (3d Cir. 2012). In addition to Ms. Peters’s 
own admissions, the circumstantial evidence – including the identification documents in 
several names, the ledgers of stolen identity information, and the surveillance photos 
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showing the same shirt found in her home – clearly provided sufficient evidence from 
which a rational juror could infer guilt. The circumstantial evidence was overwhelming 
and pointed only to Ms. Peters, not her husband. Therefore, with deference to the jury’s 
verdict, and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, we find 
the evidence was sufficient and affirm the judgment of conviction. 
IV. Conclusion 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of conviction. 
